Transport · Urda, Madrid, and Seville
AVE crashes into stopped Iryo train near Urda after LZB signalling failure
The collision happened on Wednesday, 28 October, at kilometre 118 of the Madrid-Sevilla high-speed line, after an Iryo train had stopped when the LZB protection system failed. El Mundo put the death toll at 69 on 29 October, with more than 100 people injured.
AI text based on reports by La Razón, LaVanguardia, EL PAÍS and other publishers. Published . How it is made
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In brief
The LZB system failed around 8:30 on 28 October, leaving a 69-kilometre stretch without automatic protection and forcing six trains to stop, according to a reconstruction of the morning.
At 8:36 an AVE driver was authorised to continue in normal running past a red signal without checking the stopped Iryo, which had reported transmission loss to Atocha at 8:41.
El Mundo reported 69 deaths on 29 October and more than 100 injured, although its headline gives 68 deaths.
On 27 October the Council of Ministers approved an 11.5 million euro increase to GTS's contract, which was first awarded in March 2024 for 72.5 million euros plus VAT.
Jordi Valero says investment per passenger fell 28% in five years, while high-speed passengers rose 99% between 2019 and 2025.
- 28 OctAVE driver authorised to resume in normal running
- 28 OctIryo driver reports loss of transmission to Atocha
- Collision at kilometre 118, UrdaAVE strikes the stopped Iryo 6076 near Urda station
What happened
On Wednesday, 28 October, a Renfe AVE high-speed train ran into an Iryo train at kilometre 118 of the Madrid-Sevilla line, close to Urda station in Toledo province. The Iryo, service 6076, had halted at the Urda entry signal after the LZB train protection system failed around 8:30. Its female driver tried twice to restart the train, with each attempt taking between three and four minutes according to sources close to the company cited by EFE. She then asked Iryo's control centre for help, but the AVE struck the stopped train before that assistance arrived. El Mundo reported that the AVE was travelling at more than 100 kilometres per hour, and it gave the death toll as 69 on 29 October, with more than 100 injured, although its headline gives 68.
How the signalling chain unfolded
A reconstruction of the morning says the LZB outage left a 69-kilometre stretch without automatic protection and forced six trains to stop, while control at Atocha in Madrid took over traffic management. Iryo's own hypothesis, reported by Spanish media, points to a 63-kilometre outage, which the company calls abnormal and says takes longer to reset the longer it lasts. At 8:36 an AVE driver was authorised to disconnect and reconnect his equipment and continue in normal running, passing a red signal without first checking whether the Iryo was still stationary. Under the alternative protocol, trains must proceed 'a la vista' at a maximum of 40 km/h. At 8:41 the Iryo driver told Atocha she had lost transmission and was halted at the Urda entry signal, and she was told to disconnect and reconnect. LaVanguardia reports that operators failed to link the two incidents during 17 critical minutes before the impact. Iryo's chief executive, Fabrizio Favara, had warned 23 days earlier that its trains took 'quite a long time' to reconnect after LZB failures, which he named as the most common cause of incidents on the Madrid-Andalucía corridor.
El Confidencial reports that another Iryo, service 6011, left Seville at 6:47 and stopped near kilometre 170 after the same LZB outage. Its driver received an instruction to resume in normal running without restrictions, but he noticed the error and called Atocha back in time to correct it. The Guardia Civil is examining recordings of every instruction issued by the control room in the 23 minutes before the crash.
Contract and an ageing signalling system
On Tuesday, 27 October, the Council of Ministers approved an increase of 11.5 million euros in the maintenance contract held by the joint venture GTS for the high-speed line to Andalusia, a day before the crash. The original contract, awarded in March 2024 for 72.5 million euros plus VAT over four years, covers the LZB system and the traffic control installations at Urda, according to El País. Adif accepted the expansion two years later, which El País describes as just over 15% of the initially authorised budget.
- Original contract, awarded March 2024 (plus VAT)
- 72.5 million euros
- Increase approved 27 October 2026
- 11.5 million euros
Data from the article text
“It is a system that is now being replaced. Not because it is not good, but because it is no longer manufactured.”
Maintenance and the investment debate
Experts and unions have long argued that spending on maintenance has not kept pace with traffic. Ramiro Aurín, of the Asociación de Ingenieros de Caminos, blamed a disregard for technical needs.
“There has been a disregard for the technical needs of our infrastructure.”
Jordi Valero, a retired Renfe driver, said investment per passenger had fallen 28% over five years, while high-speed passengers grew 99% between 2019 and 2025 and Adif staff rose 11%, according to LaSexta. The government says it spent 44% more on maintenance in 2025 than in 2019, a year before Ouigo and Iryo began operating in Spain. César Franco, former president of the Consejo General de Ingenieros Industriales, told Xataka that electoral cycles push back structural investment.
“Infrastructure is developed over the long term, but politics is often governed by the immediacy of four-year electoral cycles.”
Passengers stranded near the crash
A 24-year-old passenger on the first AVE that left Córdoba at 6:45 said his train stopped about 500 metres from the collision point. He said the crew did not explain the cause for more than four hours, and that passengers learned what had happened through their mobile phones. Passengers were later evacuated and taken by bus from Urda to Córdoba, along with some people hurt in the crash, mostly with minor injuries.
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Sources and context
- La RazónIryo points to the magnitude of the LZB system failure as the reason its train did not start before being struck in UrdaIryo apunta a la magnitud del fallo del sistema LZB como causa de que su tren no arrancase antes de ser embestido en Urda · original in Spanish
- LaVanguardiaThe chain of errors that caused the train accident in ToledoLa cadena de errores que ha provocado el accidente de trenes de Toledo · original in Spanish
- EL PAÍSThe Government expanded the maintenance contract for the Madrid-Sevilla line security system one day before the accidentEl Gobierno amplió el contrato de mantenimiento del sistema de seguridad de la línea Madrid-Sevilla un día antes del accidente · original in Spanish
- El ConfidencialAn Iryo that left Seville at 6:47 was saved at the last moment from another erroneous “normal running” orderUn Iryo que salió de Sevilla a las 6.47 h se salvó en el último instante de otra orden errónea de "marcha normal" · original in Spanish
- Óscar Puente
- Spain's Minister of Transport and Sustainable Mobility, who acknowledged the LZB system is being replaced
- Organizations
- European Union
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