
CIA declassifies 71 presidential briefs detailing al-Qaeda warnings before 11 September attacks
The Central Intelligence Agency released 71 presidential daily briefings from 1998 to 2001, including a 1998 warning that al-Qaeda could fly an explosive-laden aircraft into an American city.
Declassified presidential briefings
On 11 September 2026, marking the 25th anniversary of the 2001 attacks, the Central Intelligence Agency declassified 71 presidential intelligence briefs spanning from early 1998 to 12 September 2001. The release comprises more than 100 pages presented to former Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Of the 71 documents released by the agency, 69 had never before been made public. President's Daily Briefs rank among the most secretive intelligence products in the federal government and are typically held under classification for 40 to 50 years. The agency released the files in redacted form to protect intelligence sources and methods while detailing its early tracking of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.
CIA Director John Ratcliffe addressed the release in an official statement.
Twenty-five years ago, the 9/11 attacks struck a blow to our nation, but they did not break us.
Early warnings under the Clinton administration
The declassified records document that CIA analysts warned White House officials of aerial threats three years before commercial airliners were hijacked. A memo prepared on 10 September 1998 reported that Bin Laden preferred targets inside the United States, identifying Washington as a prime location. That document stated that al-Qaeda could fly an explosive-packed airplane into an American city. Another briefing delivered on 4 December 1998 advised that Bin Laden and his network were preparing attacks on American soil, including the hijacking of aircraft. The 1998 assessments followed the August 1998 bombings of United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed 224 people and triggered cruise missile strikes against targets in Afghanistan and Sudan.
- CIA reports Osama bin Laden is actively considering attacks inside the United States following embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.
- Briefing notes al-Qaeda may fly an explosive-packed airplane into an American city, naming Washington as a target.
- Memo reports Bin Laden and allies are preparing attacks in the United States, including plane hijackings.
- Briefing to George W. Bush warns Bin Laden is determined to strike the United States, citing FBI surveillance in New York.
- Intelligence memo assesses al-Qaeda operations as expert and flexible, with tight operational security.
- Post-attack brief reports that knowledge of the attack plot was widely known in extremist circles.
Intelligence leading up to September 2001
Briefings provided during 2001 documented intensifying concerns regarding al-Qaeda operations on United States soil. A briefing on 6 August 2001 informed George W. Bush that Bin Laden remained determined to strike the country, potentially utilizing operatives living domestically. That document noted FBI findings of activity consistent with hijacking preparations and recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York. A subsequent brief on 28 August 2001 characterized al-Qaeda operations as expert and flexible, while subject to disruption and delay. A memorandum written on 12 September 2001, the day after hijackers killed 2,977 people in New York, the Pentagon, and Pennsylvania, stated that knowledge of the plot had been widely known across extremist networks.
Intelligence gaps and commission findings
The released documents reflect findings from the 2004 commission established by George W. Bush to investigate the attacks. That commission found that intelligence agencies issued repeated warnings regarding al-Qaeda but struggled with incomplete data and failed to anticipate the scale of the operation. In briefings conducted before the release, CIA analysts stated that counter-terrorism collection was not a primary intelligence priority in the late 1990s, leaving reporting scarce and vague. Compartmentalization, bureaucratic barriers, and data privacy rules also restricted information sharing between the CIA and the FBI regarding suspects entering the country. Agency officials noted that while warnings reached the highest levels of government, analysts worked with limited and fragmentary reports.


