Amnesty report details Morocco intelligence surveillance network targeting journalists and foreign figures

Whistleblower reveals DGST methods

Amnesty International published a 121-page investigative report detailing what it describes as an extensive surveillance apparatus operated by Morocco's domestic intelligence agency, the Directorate General for Territorial Surveillance (DGST). The report, titled "We start with the verdict", draws on testimony from a former intelligence operative using the pseudonym Safir, alongside leaked supplier records, computer forensic analyses, and interviews with 10 Moroccan journalists and activists. The publication builds upon findings first reported in mid-July by the Forbidden Stories consortium and 14 partner newsrooms. According to the whistleblower, Moroccan intelligence routinely initiated intrusive operations against political dissidents, independent journalists, and civil society figures before obtaining judicial authorizations, with warrants frequently drafted after the fact.

High-tech tools and physical interception

The investigation outlines a surveillance system combining digital hacking tools with traditional espionage techniques. Moroccan intelligence deployed Pegasus spyware, created by Israeli firm NSO Group, between 2017 and 2021, and possibly later. Authorities also utilized the Eagle and Cerebro mass internet interception platforms previously supplied by French company Amesys. Beyond digital tools, the agency worked with local mobile phone shops to sell pre-infected second-hand handsets to targets, while also planting malware on computers in cybercafes frequented by suspects.

Physical intrusions extended directly into private residences, vehicles, and workplaces. Operatives recruited neighbours as informants and installed concealed recording hardware. Journalist Omar Radi was subjected to continuous monitoring with listening devices embedded directly into home lighting fixtures.

Morocco has fully embraced techno-authoritarian practices, acquiring a broad range of surveillance technologies that allow the establishment and operation of a repressive system specifically designed to instill fear among human rights defenders and journalists, silence them and hinder their work both in Morocco and abroad.

Cross-border targets and French officials

The documented surveillance extended across international borders, affecting human rights lawyers, activists, and foreign politicians. In March 2019, the phone number of French President Emmanuel Macron was selected within the Moroccan tracking system, though forensic evidence does not confirm whether infection occurred.

Amnesty confirmed the successful digital compromise of devices belonging to French lawyer Joseph Breham and Claude Mangin, the wife of an imprisoned Sahrawi activist. Technical forensic investigations conducted by France's national cybersecurity agency, ANSSI, identified the same attack accounts responsible for the intrusions. The report also notes that the intelligence network selected Spanish and French political figures for potential monitoring.

Intimate leaks and government response

Information harvested from private spaces was routinely weaponized in coordinated smear campaigns distributed through pro-government media outlets. In 2021, private video recordings captured by hidden cameras inside the home of activist Fouad Abdelmoumni were published online without consent to damage his reputation. Female activists were singled out for similar character defamation campaigns relying on intercepted private communications.

Moroccan authorities have consistently and categorically denied using Pegasus or maintaining an unlawful surveillance program. The Moroccan government maintains that it operates as a state based on the rule of law guaranteeing the secrecy of personal communications, previously demanding that external investigators provide concrete evidence for their claims.