Poland Considers Nuclear Deterrence: French Offer and Dispute Over Nuclear Sharing

The discussion over Poland's participation in a nuclear deterrence program has gained unprecedented momentum after a series of diplomatic signals from Paris. France, the only nuclear power in the European Union, has proposed including selected continental countries, including Poland, in its nuclear protection system. Prime Minister Donald Tusk officially admitted that intensive consultations are ongoing on this issue. This initiative, termed 'advanced deterrence,' assumes that French potential could become the foundation of European strategic autonomy. Military experts, including General Jarosław Kraszewski, appeal for joining this project as soon as possible, pointing to the necessity of having real tools to deter the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation. The change in the security paradigm is reflected in public sentiment. The latest public opinion polls show that a majority of Poles support efforts to obtain nuclear weapons, and surprisingly, this trend is particularly strong among voters of the Civic Coalition. Talks with France, however, have become the spark for another conflict on the Government-President line. Marcin Przydacz, representing the Presidential Chancellery, publicly accused the government of a lack of transparency, claiming that Andrzej Duda was not informed about the details of negotiations with Paris. The Presidential Palace has long been pushing an alternative path: joining the American Nuclear Sharing program. This duality in Polish foreign policy raises concerns about the consistency of messaging towards NATO allies. Critics of the French proposal, such as the head of the BBN Jacek Siewiera, raise the issue of Paris's credibility. Siewiera openly expressed skepticism about France's real readiness to share partial control over its arsenal with third countries, which could make this offer merely a diplomatic maneuver without hard military guarantees. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of countries participating in nuclear weapons sharing programs in Europe systematically declined, but the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 completely reversed this trend, forcing Eastern flank countries to revise their defense doctrine.„Nie wierzę w to, że Francja podzieli się swoim potencjałem nuklearnym w taki sposób, by inne państwa miały realny wpływ na jego użycie.” (I do not believe that France will share its nuclear potential in such a way that other countries have real influence over its use.) — Jacek SiewieraIn public debate, a radical postulate for building 'our own bomb' also appears. Although this scenario is currently burdened with enormous diplomatic and legal risk under the NPT treaty, analysts such as Albert Świdziński emphasize that Poland needs its own long-term nuclear strategy. Simultaneously, German media suggest that Berlin could play a key financial role in building a new nuclear shield, making the situation even more complex geopolitically. Russia officially downplays these reports, claiming that the great-power ambitions of France and Germany do not pose a real threat to its strategic dominance, which, however, is interpreted by many commentators as an element of an information war aimed at sowing discord among allies within the European Union.